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IN J U L Y  1991 ,  T H E  U N I T E D  S T A T E S  S E N A T E  V O T E D  81 to 18 to impose a $10,000 fine and a ten-year jail sentence on any HTV-infected physicians who treated patients without disclosing 
their HIV status. Senator Jesse Helms, the sponsor of the measure, ex­
plained his rationale: “Let the punishment fit the crime. . . .  I believe 
in horsewhipping. I feel that strongly about it” (Tolchin 1991). Later, 
Senator Helms wrote that HIV-infected physicians who practice medi­
cine “should be treated no better than the criminal who guns down a 
helpless victim on the street” (Helms 1991). In his article he explained 
that Kimberly Bergalis was the inspiration for his proposal. Ms. Bergalis 
was not only the inspiration for Senator Helms: when she died of AIDS 
at the age of 23 in late 1991, she was the first known patient to have 
been infected with HIV by a health care professional, her dentist, Dr. 
David Acer (Center for Disease Control 1990). Although it now appears 
that Dr. Acer infected five of his patients (Centers for Disease Control 
199 le), the case of Kimberly Bergalis was the one to capture the pub­
lic’s imagination and has been the driving force behind a movement to­
ward mandatory HIV testing o f health care workers. In a letter to 
Florida health officials in April 1991, which was widely reprinted in the 
media, she said:
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Who do I blame? Do I blame myself? I sure don’t. I never used IV 
drugs, never slept with anyone and never had a blood transfusion. I 
blame every single one of you bastards. Anyone that knew that Dr. 
Acer was infected . . . and stood by not doing a damn thing about 
it. . . . I f  laws are not formed to provide protection, then my suffer­
ing and death was [sic] in vain. (Kantrowitz 1991, 52)
Although a House-Senate conference committee ultimately rejected 
the Helms amendment, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the 
American Medical Association (AMA) both took the position that physi­
cians who engage in “exposure-prone procedures” should know their 
HIV status and inform their patients of it. When Kimberly Bergalis, 
shortly before her death, testified before a congressional committee in 
October 1991 that she “didn’t do anything wrong” and urged Congress 
to enact a law requiring the testing of health care workers for HIV, her 
15-second testimony was replayed on all the major networks. One long­
time observer of the AIDS epidemic called her testimony "political dy­
namite” ; another termed it “the most dangerous moment in the history 
of the epidemic” (Berke 1991). Opinion polls show that more than 90 
percent of the public believes that all health care workers should inform 
patients of their HIV status (Kantrowitz 1991). The case of Kimberly 
Bergalis is seen as proof that the risk of HTV transmission is “real.” With 
virtual unanimity on the issue of informing patients, and with wide 
support for mandatory HIV screening of health care workers, it is re­
markable that both the Helms amendment and less inflammatory pro­
posals have been defeated. In fact, toward the end of 1991, both the 
CDC and the AMA seemed to be retreating from their previous recom­
mendations to identify exposure-prone procedures and to require HTV- 
infected physicians who perform them to notify their patients of their 
HIV status (Leary 1991; Rosenthal 1991b; Williams 1991)-
The long dying of Kimberly Bergalis tapped strong emotional cur­
rents in the life of Americans and the AIDS epidemic. The reaction by 
the CDC, the AMA, and some courts has not been exemplary so far.1 
In this article we will examine that reaction and suggest ways of trans-
1 See e.g., Doe v. Washington University, no. 89-2589-C(4), AIDS Litigation 
Reporter (Nov. 8, 1991) 7137 (E.D. Mo. 1991); Estate o f  Behringer v. The Med­
ical Center at Princeton, 249 N.J. Super. 597, 592 A.2d 1251 (Super. Ct. N.J. 
1991)', In re Application o f Milton S. Hershey Medical Center o f the Pennsylva-
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forming it from a punitive, blame-oriented stance to one that is more 
likely to protect and promote both the public health and individual 
rights. The approach we suggest recognizes an important distinction be­
tween things that create risk and people who create risk: reducing risks 
from things is easier to accomplish without denying individuals impor­
tant freedoms and causing them unwarranted suffering. Things can be 
made safer by changes in design; if they pose unacceptable risks, they 
may be eliminated. People must be persuaded or compelled to change 
their behavior or be removed from contact with people. Yet people may 
not be deprived of their liberty without good reasons. Thus, policy op­
tions to minimize risks that people may pose to others must take into 
account the human cost of making “risky” human beings safer.
The reaction to the case of Kimberly Bergalis has assumed that health 
care practitioners can be treated like things, not people. It also suggests 
that the public is sometimes more frightened by people, especially peo­
ple with AIDS, than by things. It was recently reported, for example, 
that a Florida dermatologist infected 213 of 2,331 former patients with 
hepatitis B virus (HBV) ( Tampa Tribune-Times 1991). Three patients 
died. The number of cases of infection was more than 42 times that oc­
curring among Dr. Acer’s patients, but there were no photographs of 
victims in the newspaper and no front-page stories in weekly magazines. 
There was no indication that the physician had hepatitis B: rather, the 
transmission seems to have been caused by unsterile instruments. The 
resounding silence that met this report may stem from the inability to 
personalize the source of infection. Stories about sterilization techniques 
do not make the headlines. Yet it is these infection control techniques 
that will reduce any risk of HIV transmission in the health care setting. 
Moreover, they can be used without infringing the rights of health care 
professionals.2
nia State University, Application o f Harrisburg Hospital, Appeal o f Doe, 595 
A.2d 1290 (Super. Ct. of Pa. 1991); Doe v. Attorney General, 941 F.2d 780 
(9th Cir. 1991); Leckelt v. Board o f  Commissioners o f  Hospital District 1, 909 
F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990).
2 We use the term “health care professional” or “practitioner” in this article in 
lieu of the term “health care worker” because our discussion is restricted to those 
who may pose a risk to patients by virtue of treating or caring for them directly: 
physicians, dentists, and nurses. Health care workers, in contrast, are a broader 
category including individuals who work in the health field but do not treat pa­
tients.
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The AIDS Epidemic and the 
Case o f Kimberly Bergalis
AIDS has afflicted more than 200,000 people in the United States; of 
these 133,232 have died (Centers for Disease Control 1992). It is well 
known how the virus is spread, which populations are at highest risk, 
and that only prevention can stop the dissemination of the virus (Cen­
ters for Disease Control 1991c). Among the more than one million peo­
ple with AIDS or HIV infection, only five have been identified as 
probably contracting the disease from one dentist. No other case of 
transmission from health care practitioner to patient is known. Why has 
this one cluster caused a concern so disproportionate to the numbers?
AIDS is largely a disease of what is deemed to be voluntary behavior: 
sex and intravenous drug use. As a result, most Americans, particularly 
white, middle-class Americans, do not feel at risk. Individuals who are 
heterosexual, relatively monogamous, do not use intravenous drugs, and 
do not have sex with intravenous drug users can feel confident that 
AIDS does not threaten their lives. Statistics support their confidence. 
This sense of personal safety was severely assaulted by the news that a 
Florida dentist, Dr. David Acer, apparently infected five patients. How 
these transmissions occurred is still not known and may never be. Was 
it from a wound through which he bled into a patient’s wound? Was it 
the result of his apparently poor infection control procedures? Or was 
it the intentional act of a deranged or spiteful person? Whatever the an­
swer, the general public feels newly vulnerable. If Kimberly Bergalis, an 
attractive, young, white woman who did not engage in other risky be­
haviors, can suffer and die from this horrible disease, then no one can 
feel safe. Perhaps as important, Ms. Bergalis contracted the disease from 
a dentist, a health care professional, whose role is to enhance health, 
not to cause infection with a deadly virus.
This single case of transmission has diverted our attention from the 
work that is required to slow the epidemic. Unlike programs designed to 
convince intravenous drug users to use clean needles or at-risk individu­
als to use condoms, the issue of HIV-positive health care professionals is 
largely irrelevant to the public health goal of controlling the AIDS epi­
demic because these individuals do not spread it. If every HIV-positive 
health care worker were excluded from practice, it would have virtually 
no impact on the epidemic.
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Nevertheless, the public debate over HIV-infected health care profes­
sionals offers an opportunity to consider how to protect the rights of 
HIV-positive practitioners and how rationally to assess risks to others. 
The goal of public health should be to ascertain risks to a population, 
put these risks in perspective, and try to identify reasonable actions that 
will reduce risks. When a risk appears very frightening, public health 
experts must provide accurate information and suggest appropriate ac­
tion without inciting public panic or unduly restricting individual free­
dom. Of course, reasonable measures should be taken by hospitals and 
health care workers to reduce the risk of HIV transmission. The question 
is, What steps are reasonable in accomplishing this goal?
Discrimination against health care professionals is not a reasonable or 
necessary means of combatting the AIDS epidemic. Health care profes­
sionals, particularly surgeons, are not typically viewed as members of an 
oppressed class in need of protection. However, once they are infected, 
their HIV-positive status quickly overshadows their occupational status, 
and leaves them as vulnerable as any other person with HIV to discrimi­
natory treatment by their employers. As such, they need and deserve 
the protection of antidiscrimination law and policy.
The Response of the CDC
Even prior to the Acer case, the Centers for Disease Control had adopted 
policies regarding HIV-positive health care workers (Centers for Disease 
Control 1985, 1986, 1987). Although the CDC’s response had been cau­
tious and somewhat equivocal (Barnes et al. 1990), it had always em­
phasized infection control measures. The 1985 recommendations stressed 
that infected workers who performed noninvasive procedures presented 
no risk of harm to others, offered no opinion on the “employability of 
infected workers performing invasive procedures,” specifically deferred 
the question of testing practitioners who perform invasive procedures, 
and recommended that infected health care workers undergo an individ­
ual review by their personal physician and the employee health services 
to determine ways to minimize their own risk of acquiring infectious dis­
eases from patients (Centers for Disease Control 1985).
In 1986 the CDC stated that mandatory HIV screening of health care 
practitioners who performed invasive procedures was not necessary because 
testing would not further reduce the “negligible risks of transmission” if
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universal precautions were used (Centers for Disease Control 1986). The 
CDC determined these risks to be so negligible that infected health care 
practitioners could safely continue to perform invasive procedures. The 
1987 guidelines have been characterized as "reversing course” (Barnes et 
al. 1990). Rather than eschewing mandatory testing, the CDC said it 
could not assess the “utility of routine testing” and pointed out that 
transmission from infected health care practitioners to patients “remains 
a possibility” (Centers for Disease Control 1987). The 1987 guidelines 
also called for individual review of all infected workers, not just those 
who perform invasive procedures, so the employer institution could de­
termine if the health care worker “can adequately and safely be allowed 
to perform patient-care duties. . .” (Barnes 1990, 314). Still, in the ab­
sence of any well-publicized case of practitioner-to-patient transmission, 
none of these earlier recommendations led to screening all health care 
practitioners for HIV infection.
The CDC’s “Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Hu­
man Immunodeficiency Vims and Hepatitis B Vims to Patients During 
Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures” were issued on July 12, 1991, after 
Dr. Acer and Kimberly Bergalis became household names (Centers for 
Disease Control 1991b). In the background section, the CDC noted that 
since the early 1970s there have been published reports of 20 clusters of 
hepatitis B vims (HBV) involving transmission from practitioners with 
HBV to more than 300 patients. In 12 of the clusters the practitioner did 
not wear gloves. Most of these clusters “occurred before awareness in­
creased of the risks of blood-borne pathogens in health care settings,” 
and the use of universal precautions (Centers for Disease Control 1991b). 
The report then stated: “The limited number of reports of HBV trans­
mission from [health care workers] to patients in recent years may reflect 
the adoption of universal precautions and increased use of HBV vaccine.”
The CDC estimated that the risk of transmitting HTV is one hun­
dredth of the risk of transmitting HBV and that there was one reported 
HIV transmission cluster involving one dentist and five patients; more­
over, four studies involving three HIV-infected surgeons and one HTV- 
infected dental student found no transmissions (Centers for Disease 
Control 1991b). Nevertheless, the CDC assumed that certain procedures 
are “exposure-prone,” particularly those that involve “digital palpation 
of a needle tip in a body cavity or the simultaneous presence of the 
health care worker’s finger and a needle or other sharp instrument or 
object in a poorly visualized or highly confined anatomic site.”
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On the basis of this experience with HBV transmission and its as­
sumption about exposure-prone procedures, in July 1991 the CDC rec­
ommended:
1. Adherence to universal precautions and other infection control 
sterilization procedures.
2. No restrictions on the practice of health care workers infected with 
HIV or HBV who perform invasive procedures that are not “expo- 
sure-prone” as long as they use universal precautions and practice 
recommended surgical or dental techniques.
3. Exposure-prone procedures should be identified by medical/surgi­
cal/dental organizations and institutions.
4. Health care workers who perform exposure-prone procedures 
“should know” their HIV antibody status and their HBV status.
5. Health care workers “who are infected with HIV or HBV (and are 
HBeAg positive) should not perform exposure-prone procedures 
unless they have sought counsel from an expert review panel and 
been advised under what circumstances, if any, they may continue 
to perform these procedures. Such circumstances would include 
notifying prospective patient of the health care workers’ seroposi- 
tivity before they undergo exposure-prone invasive procedures.”
6. There should not be mandatory testing of health care workers 
(Centers for Disease Control 1991b).
The CDC also stated that health care workers whose practices are 
modified because of their HIV or HBV status should be provided oppor­
tunities for appropriate patient care activities, career counseling, and job 
retraining.
The recommendations are internally inconsistent. They state that 
health care workers should know whether they are infected with HIV or 
HBV. The only way to enforce such a recommendation would be by 
testing, yet mandatory testing was specifically rejected. In support of its 
position against mandatory testing, the CDC argued that the current as­
sessment of the risk of transmission does not support the “diversion of 
resources that would be required to implement such a mandatory testing 
program” (Centers for Disease Control 1991b). However, if all health 
care practitioners who perform exposure-prone procedures should know 
their HIV antibody status, the resources required to comply with this 
recommendation would be no different from the resources required for
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mandatory testing. Furthermore, if the CDC believed health care practi­
tioners who perform invasive procedures were dangerous enough to be 
prohibited from performing such procedures, then, to be consistent, the 
CDC should at least have encouraged institutions to try to locate these 
workers. The expert review panel’s function under these recommenda­
tions is also unclear. If an infected health care practitioner could not 
perform invasive procedures, and these procedures were defined or 
listed as the CDC planned, what role could such a review panel perform?
Finally, the patient notification provision was not an infection control 
measure. We are not aware of another infection control measure that 
may be overridden by patient consent. The CDC did not state that 
health care practitioners could decide to forego the use of universal pre­
cautions or the sterilization of their instruments with the consent of 
their patients. If infected practitioners are too dangerous to perform in­
vasive procedures, and are thereby a menace to public health, notifying 
patients will not remove this danger. It would be an odd public health 
measure that substituted consent to risk for risk prevention, especially in 
the context of an epidemic. Of course, if no patient would consent, 
then the recommendation that patients be notified of a practitioner’s 
seropositivity would produce the same result as a recommendation that 
such practitioners cease practice.
What might have led to such incoherent recommendations? One pos­
sibility may have been the political climate in Congress. While the CDC 
deliberated over its recommendations, Congress had before it bills that 
proposed mandatory testing of health care practitioners and criminal 
sanctions for infected practitioners who performed invasive procedures. 
Senator Helms’s bill was introduced in January 1991 and a revised bill 
was voted on in July 1991 (U.S. Congress 1991c). The mandatory test­
ing bill was introduced by Representative Dannemeyer only a few weeks 
before the recommendations were issued (U.S. Congress 1991a). Even if 
the CDC believed that mandatory testing and exclusion were unwar­
ranted, it may have felt pressured to take a stand that would appear to 
provide increased public protection in order to forestall more radical 
congressional action. In this sense the CDC’s July 12, 1991, recommen­
dations can be viewed as a political compromise. They were much more 
stringent than their prior recommendations, yet they were based on lit­
tle or no additional information on the history of HIV and HBV trans­
mission, needlestick injuries, or related data. The CDC, in fact, 
prefaced its specific recommendations by stating that the risk of HBV
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transmission from health care worker to patient is “small” and the risk 
of transmitting HIV is “ even smaller” (Centers for Disease Control 
1991b). Because the risk of HBV transmission has always been small and 
is declining, and the risk of HIV transmission is one hundredth that of 
HBV transmission, the only reason for issuing new recommendations 
appears to have been to make a public response to the Acer case.
The AMA’s Reaction
The American Medical Association (AMA) issued guidelines in 1988 
stating that “ if a risk of transmission” of an infectious disease exists 
from a particular activity, the physician "should not engage in the activ­
ity” (Barnes et al. 1990). The 1988 guidelines also noted that disclosure 
to patients was not sufficient (American Medical Association 1988). On 
January 17, 1991, immediately after the CDC confirmed the Acer case 
(Centers for Disease Control 1991e), which had been first reported six 
months earlier, the AM A issued a statement on HIV-infected physicians 
(American Medical Association 1991). The statement began, “Physicians 
who are HIV positive have an ethical obligation not to engage in any 
professional activity which has an identifiable risk of transmission of the 
infection to the patient” [emphasis added] (American Medical Associa­
tion 1991). The statement then explained that, although there has 
never been a case of transmission of HIV from a physician to a patient, 
the Acer case caused some uncertainty about the risk of transmission; 
where there was such uncertainty the medical profession “should err on 
the side of protecting patients.” The AM A concluded that physicians 
must either abstain from performing invasive procedures that pose an 
“identifiable risk of transmission,” or “disclose their seropositive status 
prior to performing a procedure and proceed only if there is informed 
consent. ”
The AMA statement sets forth a remarkable notion of risk—one it 
had never before used to guide the practice of medicine. If the AMA 
applied this strict “ethical” standard to all physicians, not just HIV- 
infected physicians, it would make the practice of medicine impossible. 
In its 1988 statement the AMA had used the term “a risk” of transmis­
sion. In 1991 it used the term “identifiable risk.” Neither the term "a 
risk” nor “identifiable risk” provides any leeway. Airplanes falling out 
of the sky and crushing people in their homes, being hit by lightning,
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and death from anesthesia are all risks and identifiable risks. It is remark­
able that the AMA would assert that physicians may not subject people 
to any risks. If this were so, it would certainly be the end of the practice 
of surgery, of prescribing drugs, and of taking X  rays. It is notable that 
the statement by the AMA, a group not known for strong stands on pa­
tients’ rights, indicates a belief that physicians have an ethical obligation 
to inform patients of identifiable risks, a standard much more expansive 
than the most patient-centered court or legislature would dream of im­
posing (Annas, Glantz, and Katz 1977; Faden and Beauchamp 1986).
Dr. Nancy Dickey, an AMA trustee, has said that the risk of HTV 
transmission is very low, but “real” (Barnes 1990). This seems odd be­
cause there has been no case of a physician transmitting HIV to a patient. 
Indeed, “ lookback” studies have tested former patients of physicians 
who had AIDS without finding a single instance of physician-to-patient 
HIV transmission (Armstrong, Miner, and Wolfe 1987; Danila et al. 
1991; Mishu et al. 1990). Dr. Dickey also has argued that the AMA pol­
icy is derived from the physician’s obligation to “do no harm.” But her 
reliance on this doctrine is surely misplaced. There is a distinction be­
tween “do no harm” and “do nothing that risks harm.” If physicians 
could not risk harm, no drug or surgery could be used. When it comes 
to HIV the AMA has been unable to distinguish between the risk of 
harm and harm itself.
According to the logic of the AMA’s statement, a one in a billion 
risk, a one in 100,000 risk, and a one in two risk should all be treated 
equally because each risk is “identifiable.” Because the AMA cannot 
possibly believe this, it must believe that the risk of AIDS should be 
treated differently from all other types of risks. For example, a recent 
study of the incidence of malpractice in New York state found that a pa­
tient in a New York hospital has about a 1 percent chance of being in­
jured as a result of malpractice (Brennan et al. 1991). An estimated
100,000 additional patients were injured as a result of adverse events 
not caused by negligence in 1984. About 13,000 patients a year die 
from adverse events, with 7,000 attributable to negligent care. This 
means that approximately 20 patients per day die from negligent care in 
one state alone. However, there has been no response from the AMA 
calling for measures to reduce these risks, urging physicians to avoid 
sending patients to New York hospitals, or requiring physicians who 
have been guilty of malpractice to so notify their patients.
Why did the AMA so readily abandon its HIV-infected colleagues? It
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certainly took no similar action in the 1970s when HBV clusters were be­
ing discovered. The AMA’s reaction may have been stimulated by sev­
eral considerations. First, there may be a genuine concern for patient 
safety, although it is unclear why the AMA would choose this minuscule 
risk on which to take a stand if patient safety were its primary concern. 
Second, only a few physicians will be affected by the policy, and in re­
turn the AMA could represent to the public that it is protecting pa­
tients, even at the cost of restricting the practice of physicians. With 
doctors and patients increasingly viewing each other as threats rather 
than as partners in a therapeutic relationship, there is much to be said 
for this goal, however misguided its means of attainment. Third, there is 
no reason to believe that physicians want to be treated by HIV-infected 
physicians any more than the general population. Finally, the AMA pol­
icy may simply be an indication of the power of the AIDS stigma. HIV- 
infected doctors are no longer viewed primarily as doctors, even by their 
own colleagues, but are largely placed in the role of agents of harm.
In any event, if the CDC’s and AMA’s goals were to calm the Ameri­
can public, their methods backfired. By concluding that some HIV- 
infected physicians were simply too dangerous to practice medicine, 
they only inflamed public fears. Both policies fed the fear of large num­
bers of individuals who do not engage in at-risk behaviors that some 
doctors could kill them. Nice distinctions between invasive and non- 
invasive procedures may be lost on the public. Physicians, regardless of 
speciality, cannot feel that their careers are safe if they are HIV infected.
New Recommendations, Similar Problems
In late 1991, both the CDC and the AMA reconsidered their policies on 
HIV-infected health care workers, presumably in response to the nega­
tive reaction of medical, public health, and community groups (Ameri­
can College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 1991; Hilts 1991; Leary 
1991; New York State Department of Health 1991; Rogers and Osborne 
1991; Rosenthal 1991a,b; Scott 1991). The CDC drafted new recom­
mendations that abandoned the creation of a list of exposure-prone pro­
cedures. Although the final version of new recommendations was not 
available by the end of the year, preliminary drafts may indicate a new 
approach. In one draft, the CDC concluded that the determination of 
whether a particular invasive procedure is exposure prone must be made
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on an individual basis, considering the individual’s technique, skill, and 
medical condition as well as the procedure itself (Centers for Disease 
Control 1991a)- This recognizes,, correctly we think, that if any risk of 
transmission exists, it would be the result, not of the mere fact that a 
health care professional was infected with HTV, but of the practitioner’s 
lack of skill or technique. The risk is skill specific, not procedure specific.
The draft recommendations indicate that HIV- (and HBV-) infected 
health care practitioners who perform surgical and obstetric procedures 
(involving surgical entry into tissues, cavities, or organs) or procedures 
involving cutting or removal of oral or perioral tissues should seek advice 
from an expert review panel to determine which procedures should and 
should not be performed. The review panel is to base its decision on 
three factors:
1. whether the practitioner performs procedures that “could result” 
in injury from the practitioner’s blood contaminating the patient’s 
body cavity or tissues
2. the practitioner’s techniques, skill, and experience, and compli­
ance with infection control practices
3. any physical or mental impairment that may interfere with the 
practitioner’s ability to practice properly
The potential utility of such recommendations, if they are adopted, is 
unclear. If the CDC and most medical specialty groups cannot identify 
exposure-prone procedures that could result in transmission, it is un­
likely that a local “expert” panel can do so, as the first factor would re­
quire. Without identifying specific procedures, any invasive procedure 
might pose a theoretical risk under the right circumstances, so all such 
procedures could be considered relevant. Different local panels may also 
create different lists, and there is no reason to believe that they will be 
consistent from place to place. Local hospitals tend to be more protec­
tive of institutional interests than of individual rights. Thus, the use of 
local panels invites arbitrary decisions. A physician could move from 
town to town and be subject to different rules in each place.
Where the expert panel is uncertain about whether procedures may 
pose a “small risk” —which is likely to be often —the draft recommenda­
tions permit advising the practitioner to perform certain procedures only 
with the patient’s consent. This perpetuates the misconception that 
there is a right to know the HIV status o f a health care professional.
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Moreover, all health care practitioners, not just those who are HIV or 
HBV infected, should be (and are already) subject to the second and 
third requirements because these concern the person’s ability to practice 
competently. Unfortunately the draft recommendations imply that 
these requirements apply only to health care workers with HIV or HBV 
infection. However, a hospital or other employer does not need to know 
a practitioner’s HIV or HBV status to ensure that he or she has adequate 
skills and abilities for practice. Health care practitioners who cannot 
meet these requirements should be retrained or suspended from practice 
until they meet professional standards, regardless of their HIV or HBV 
status.
Finally, this draft of the new recommendations states that current as­
sessments of the risk of transmission do not justify mandatory testing, 
yet they continue to recommend that health care workers who perform 
certain invasive procedures should know their antibody status. Thus, the 
basis for the very mandatory testing that the CDC finds unjustified re­
mains in its draft revised recommendations.
At the same time, the draft recommendations offer a beneficial new 
addition: they list procedures that are “not invasive,” thereby clarifying 
which procedures do not present a risk of transmission and helping to 
assuage the unnecessary fears of patients. This should also remove an ex­
cuse for hospitals and courts who misapprehend the risk of transmission 
summarily to fire health care practitioners who perform these noninva- 
sive procedures without posing any risk of transmission.
Risk Perception
These reactions to the case of Dr. Acer and Ms. Bergalis seem to be 
based on the assumption that personal fears and perceptions of risk are 
sufficient to dictate public policy, regardless of the consequences. Both 
the general public and the health professions are increasingly incapable 
of assessing risks and putting them in perspective in contemporary 
America. This is because risk perception has come to be based, not on 
probabilities, but rather on excessive personal perceptions of vulnerabil­
ity, political considerations, and changing societal expectations (Barsky
1988). The concept of “acceptable risk” (Fischoff 1981) is disappearing 
and being replaced by a “no-risk” ethic—indeed the AMA policy (and,
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to a large degree, the CDC policy) tries to promise a risk-free world. It 
is no surprise that the public prefers no risk. What is new is the willing­
ness of the experts to embrace the same notion in the case of HIV trans­
mission.
Ordinarily, the public perceives particular risks quite differently than 
experts do. Experts focus on the probability and magnitude of a hazard­
ous occurrence, whereas the public often ignores quantitative assess­
ments and worries about the nature of a potential hazard, without 
regard to the likelihood that it will happen (Slovic 1987). For example, 
the public may greatly fear a minuscule chance of dying in a nuclear 
reactor accident, while accepting a much larger and more immediate 
chance of dying in a motor vehicle accident. One reason for this is the 
newness of the threat. When it comes to risks, familiarity often breeds 
acceptance. A new threat stands out distinctly from the background, 
and is rarely compared with familiar existing risks. Increasingly, smaller 
and smaller risks have this bas-relief effect. As science and public health 
all but eradicated the historically significant killers—by sanitation, clean 
water, and pure food—lesser risks moved to the foreground.
Public reaction to new risks is also affected by the “ease with which 
adverse consequences can be imagined” (Lichenstein et al. 1978; Slovic 
1991, 303; Tversky and Kahneman 1973). Science fiction may have en­
dowed the public with a particularly rich imagination for disasters 
caused by exotic new technology and diseases. Similarly, public reaction 
to a given cause of death is affected by “psychic proximity” (Rescher
1987). Our ability to imagine ourselves in the place of victims tends to 
shape our opinion of whether or not the risk is tolerable.
Risks also tend to be tolerated in direct proportion to the degree to 
which they are voluntarily accepted by their victims. When benefits are 
apparent and immediate, risks are also more easily accepted than when 
benefits accrue over many years and are spread over a large population 
or are enjoyed by those who did not take the initial risk (Slovic 1987, 
1991). Risks of many medications are accepted, whereas having a haz­
ardous waste facility next door is not.
Finally, there is what might be called the “horror quotient” of dan­
ger. The more horrible the type of death, and the more imaginable that 
horror, the more intolerable it becomes (Rescher 1987). If people think 
of death at all, they are more likely to consider how they do not want to 
die than how they probably will die.
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Kimberly Bergalis’s death from AIDS presumably acquired from her 
dentist combines all the characteristics that influence individuals’ per­
ception of their own risk and amplify the resulting fear. Most heterosex­
ual, non-IV drug user Americans do not see themselves as at risk for 
HIV infection. The infection of Kimberly Bergalis represented a new 
threat. The nature of AIDS, as played out in public by her dying, was 
especially horrible. The public naturally concentrated on the real harm 
to Ms. Bergalis, rather than on the probability of that harm occurring. 
Also, because it was seen as a new harm, it regained immediate atten­
tion. “Old” background harms from physicians, such as iatrogenic dis­
eases, nosocomial infections, or negligently caused injuries, were ignored 
because they were familiar and had already been accepted. It was also 
very easy for middle-class Americans to identify with Ms. Bergalis and to 
imagine her fate being theirs. Finally, because her dentist did not tell 
her of his HIV status, she was exposed to risk involuntarily, and such 
risks are even less tolerated.
Theories of risk perception help explain the public reaction to the 
Acer/Bergalis case, but they do not tell us anything about whether this 
reaction is justified. In particular, public fear of any given danger alone, 
however real, has never been sufficient by itself to require that steps be 
taken to eliminate the danger entirely. Social policy must take into ac­
count more than individual fear. It must weigh the possible benefits 
and costs of a potentially dangerous social activity against the benefits 
and costs that would result from avoiding the activity. In particular, re­
sponsible social policy requires distinguishing between regulating things 
perceived as dangerous, such as chemicals with no rights, and regulating 
people perceived as dangerous, who do have rights. The level of tolera­
ble risk may be higher when people, rather than things, are the source 
of risk because the burdens on people, including the loss of their rights, 
required to reduce a risk may be less tolerable than living with slightly 
more risk.
Social decisions to accept or prevent particular risks seem to classify 
risks into two general categories: (1) socially impermissible risks that no 
one should be allowed to take or impose on others include such activi­
ties as landing aircraft on a residential street and shooting guns in the 
city; and (2) socially acceptable risks that are tolerated by society. So­
cially acceptable risks may be further divided into two classes: (a) op­
tional risks that people may choose to take or avoid, and (b) accepted
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risks that people may be compelled to take or have imposed on them 
because the compensating benefits or the costs of avoiding the risk are 
too great. Optional risks include activities and products with potential 
dangers, such as smoking cigarettes, drinking alcohol, taking prescrip­
tion drugs, working as a high-rise window washer, playing football, and 
undergoing surgery. Society is willing to permit people voluntarily to 
take their chances with such things, but does not require people to in­
dulge. Accepted risks are those that at least some people may not avoid, 
regardless of their preferences, without leaving the society. Minimum 
levels of pollution and automobile use have been deemed a tolerable 
risk of living in society. Perhaps the best example of accepted risks are 
childhood immunization programs, which require children to be immu­
nized against infectious diseases. A few children will suffer serious ad­
verse reactions to a vaccine so that society at large can be protected from 
infectious diseases. The determinative factors in classifying risks into 
these three categories are the nature of the harm, the probability it will 
occur, the accompanying benefits, and the costs, both economic and 
human, of avoiding them.
Social policy decision making on risks is the process of evaluating and 
weighing these factors to classify risks as socially impermissible, op­
tional, or accepted. Exaggerated fears sometimes drive policy making. 
The question is not, however, whether people are afraid of getting HTV 
or AIDS from health care professionals; it is whether that fear justifies a 
policy of excluding health care professionals from taking care of pa­
tients. To answer this question, it is necessary to analyze critically the 
degree of risk posed by HIV-infected practitioners, the benefits of per­
mitting them to continue to practice, and the costs of excluding them 
from practice. When, as here, however, people are the source of risk, 
the analysis of policy options requires an additional consideration. Al­
though the approach is similar to analyzing the reduction of risks caused 
by things, it must measure the costs in human terms. When people are 
the source of risk, one of the costs of risk reduction is human rights.
Much of the post-Bergalis political debate has assumed that HIV- 
infected health care practitioners offer little or no benefit to patients 
and that the risk they pose could be avoided at no cost (see the article 
by Daniels in this issue). The risk has been assumed to be unacceptably 
high, without characterizing it more specifically than “a risk” or “real.” 
For example, the proposed Kimberly Bergalis Patient and Health Pro­
vider Protection Act of 1991 would have prohibited anyone with “HIV
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disease” from performing medical and dental procedures that would 
pose “a risk” of transmission to a patient (U.S. Congress 1991a). This 
bill, which was superseded by Public Law 102-141 requiring states to is­
sue their own guidelines, characterized any risk of HIV transmission 
from health care practitioner to patient as socially impermissible.3 An­
other provision of the same bill, however, would have permitted health 
care professionals to perform such prohibited procedures if they in­
formed the patient that they had HIV disease and obtained the pa­
tient’s written consent. This inconsistent provision characterized the risk 
as optional.
Ironically, many supporters of this and similar bills are self-described 
political conservatives. They ordinarily subscribe to the idea that the 
public is too risk averse and should accept more, or at least existing, 
risks as the reasonable cost of economic development and industrial 
progress (Wildavsky and Dake 1990; Zeckhauser and Viscusi 1990). Po­
litical liberals, on the other hand, have often advocated reducing even 
small risks, to the environment and ecology, for example, but they are 
reluctant to infringe on individual rights (Wildavsky and Dake 1990). 
In this case, the economic benefits of keeping HIV-infected health care 
professionals in practice are not well understood, whereas the major visi­
ble costs of excluding them accrue to the practitioners themselves. Thus, 
conservatives and liberals have reversed positions on the issue of HIV- 
infected health care practitioners. This is because the goal of protect­
ing patients from exposure to HIV infection is being sought not by 
merely regulating things, but at the expense of the liberty of health care 
practitioners.
The general goal of increasing patient safety is unquestionably worth­
while and important. The issue, in this instance, is whether this goal is 
attainable without abridging the rights of practitioners.
Risks and Rights
For years persons with disabilities were excluded from schools and work­
places. It was often, and still is, argued that persons with disabilities 
pose a danger to others. A deaf person might not be able to follow ver­
bal instructions in an emergency. A wheelchair user might block exit
3 P.L.102-141. Approved October 28, 1991- Treasury, Postal Service and Gen­
eral Government Appropriations Act, 1992. 102d Congress (1991).
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routes in a fire. Recently the executive director of the President’s Com­
mittee on the Employment of People with Disabilities was denied trans­
portation by a commuter airline because he used a wheelchair. Officials 
of the airline explained, “If you can’t walk up and down the stairs you 
are a danger to yourself and a safety hazard” (Holmes 1991). Rick 
Douglas, the person denied boarding, said, “I’m still stunned.” And 
well he should be. There are no reports, as far as we can find, of wheel­
chair-related airline deaths. Of all the things that kill people in air 
crashes, the presence of a wheelchair, or a person who uses a wheelchair, 
would appear to be an insignificant causal factor.
The assumption that Mr. Douglas presents a danger to others is based 
on a series of “what ifs.” What if there is a crash, and what if everyone 
does not die instantly, and what if all the exits are blocked except for 
the one with the wheelchair in its way. The presence of a person who 
uses a wheelchair on a plane may, in fact, increase risks to others. In­
deed, that risk is probably identifiable. However, the social policy ques­
tion is whether the perceived risk is great enough to exclude wheelchair 
users from engaging in activities that require air travel. The answer is 
no.
When the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was passed, and, more 
recendy, when the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was enacted, 
the risk presented by people with disabling conditions was balanced 
against the harm done to disabled persons, and the larger society, by ex­
cluding these persons from activities the rest of society enjoys and val­
ues. The acts embody the social policy decision that some risks should 
be tolerated to achieve the larger goal of social justice for those who 
could participate in society if, instead of creating artificial barriers, it 
lowered some of the existing barriers. The rules of the “what if” game 
were changed.
James Strathie, for example, was issued a license to drive a school bus 
after successfully completing a training course and passing the bus 
driver’s licensing test required by the Pennsylvania Department of 
Transportation. After safely working as a school bus driver for one day, 
he was notified by the department that his license was suspended indef­
initely because he wore a hearing aid. The department’s regulation re­
quired school-bus drivers to have hearing capacity Mr. Strathie could 
not meet without his hearing aid. The department argued that its li­
censing program was designed “to ensure the highest level of safety,” 
and viewed its responsibility as eliminating “as many potential safety
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risks as it can.” The department argued a series of what ifs: what if the 
hearing aid becomes dislodged, or the battery suddenly wears out, or 
the hearing aid simply breaks. All of these matters can be addressed by 
inspection of hearing aids or regular battery replacement or having an 
extra on hand, as Strathie volunteered to do. Of course, a driver whose 
hearing aid is dislodged presents much less of a risk than a driver whose 
eyeglasses become dislodged. The federal court of appeals decided that 
the district court’s ruling, which had accepted the department’s argu­
ments and permitted his exclusion from the workplace, was wrong.4
Drivers who wear hearing aids or eyeglasses may well present risks to 
others on the road that are not presented by drivers who do not require 
such aids. However, such identifiable risks are not sufficient to prohibit 
these individuals from engaging in the activities, not only because the 
risks are remote and minimal, but also because the negative impact on 
the life of the excluded individual is great.
The fact that people have an exaggerated fear of a particular risk is 
not enough to prohibit an otherwise qualified person from engaging in 
common activities. In 1985, a group of frightened parents learned that 
an HIV-infected seven-year-old child was to attend a public school. 
These parents sued the New York City Board of Education either to pro­
hibit this child’s admission or to require the board to identify the 
child.5 To its credit, the board defended this child’s right to receive a 
public education free of harassment. In 1985, AIDS was still a relatively 
new phenomenon, particularly to this Queens neighborhood. The par­
ents presented a series of what-if scenarios: what if the infected child 
bites another child, or what if there is a fight in the school yard and the 
infected child bleeds on another child with an open wound? All the 
public health authorities testified that risk of transmission from child to 
child was highly unlikely. The terms used included “highly, highly im­
probable,” “highly unlikely,” “ extremely highly improbable” and 
“practically nonexistent.” What parents wanted, however, was a guaran­
tee of absolute safety, something that scientists do not provide. The par­
ents’ position was, Why take any risk? Who wants to be the first victim?
The court rejected a zero risk standard, saying that some “minimal 
theoretical risk” is not enough to exclude children from school.6 The
4 Strathie v. Department o f Transportation, 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983).
5 District 27 Community School Board v. Board o f Education o f  the City o f  
New York, 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct., Queens Co. 1986).
6 Id. at 332.
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court relied on an earlier ruling that forbade the New York City Board 
of Education from excluding mentally retarded children who were carriers 
of the hepatitis B virus from public schools.7 If children with HBV, 
which was described as “far more contagious” than HTV, could not be 
excluded from schools, then certainly HIV-infected children could not 
be excluded. The exclusion of the children with HBV would make the 
schools “safer"; but any risk they posed was simply not sufficient to ex­
clude them. Both of these courts were influenced by the fact that no ef­
fort was being made by the schools to identify either HIV- or 
HBV-infected children. The schools were excluding infected children 
who were simply unfortunate enough to be identified in a haphazard 
way. Apparently the courts felt that if the risk presented by these chil­
dren was not significant enough to expend effort and funds to identify 
them, the risk was also not significant enough to exclude them from 
school. This has obvious parallels to the exclusion of health care profes­
sionals when they happen to be identified, while denying the utility of 
mandatory testing.
These cases demonstrate that a fair antidiscrimination policy simply 
cannot be based on a “no risk” standard. Nor do exaggerated percep­
tions of risk justify exclusion. Instead, the law requires demonstration of 
a “significant risk” to exclude an otherwise qualified person from the 
workplace. In School Board o f  Nassau County v. Arline, the U.S. Su­
preme Court prohibited a school system from discharging a teacher who 
had a recurrence of tuberculosis she had contracted 20 years earlier.8 
The Court found that having a contagious disease qualified a person as 
a “handicapped individual” under the federal Rehabilitation Act. She 
was therefore protected against discrimination unless she was not “oth­
erwise qualified” to perform her job. The Court found:
A person who poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious 
disease to others in the workplace will not be otherwise qualified for 
his or her job if reasonable accommodation will not eliminate that 
risk. The Act would not require a school board to place a teacher with 
active, contagious tuberculosis in a classroom with elementary school 
children.9
7 N. Y. State Association fo r Retarded Children v. Carey, 466 F. Supp. 479 
(E.D. N.Y.), aff’d, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979).
*480 U.S. 273 (1987).
9 Id. at 1131, n.16 (emphasis added).
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To determine whether a person poses a significant risk, an “individu­
alized inquiry” must be made in each case. The AMA offered standards 
for this inquiry that the Supreme Court adopted in Arline. The AMA 
said that a finding regarding the presence of a significant risk should be 
“based on reasonable medical judgments given the state of medical 
knowledge” about (1) how the disease is transmitted, (2) the duration 
of the risk, (3) the severity of the potential harm if the disease is trans­
mitted, and (4) the probability of transmission.
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) adopted this approach in 
its implementing regulations. One of the defenses available to an em­
ployer accused of discrimination under the ADA is that an otherwise 
protected person with a disability poses a “direct threat to the health or 
safety of the individual or others in the workplace.”10 The term “direct 
threat” is defined as “a significant risk of substantial harm to the health 
or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or re­
duced by reasonable accommodation.”11 The regulations adopt the four 
Arline criteria, and add to that list “ the imminence of the potential 
harm.” The assessment of the presence of a direct threat of harm must 
be made on “the best available objective evidence.” 12 The “interpretive 
guidance” appendix to this regulation states: “The risk can only be con­
sidered when it poses a significant risk, i.e., high probability, of sub­
stantial harm; a speculative or remote risk is insufficient.” The party 
that wishes to exclude someone from the workplace bears the burden of 
proving the person is a direct threat.
The standard for assessing threat thus has two main parts: there must 
be (1) a high probability of (2) substantial harm. The arguments for ex­
cluding health care practitioners have focused solely on substantial 
harm, and have ignored the extremely low probability that this harm 
will occur. Any risk of death sounds too great when the probabilities are 
ignored. This is the same argument that was used to exclude wheelchair 
users from airplanes and hearing-aid users from driving school buses. 
However, one must assess the risk of death, not merely state its possibil­
ity. The risk of transmission of HIV from a physician or nurse to a pa­
tient is unknown because it has never happened. The risk of transmission
10 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 1991. Equal Employment Op­
portunity for Individuals with Disabilities; Final Rule. 29 C.F.R. 1630.13 (b) (2) 
(July 26).
11 29 C.F.R. I630.2(r).
12 Id.
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by a dentist is also unknown, even though one dentist has transmitted 
the virus to his patients. This is because the Acer case is unique and un­
explained, especially given the fact that there have been no reported 
cases of HBV transmission from a dentist to a patient since 1987, and 
HBV transmission by the same route is at least 100 times more likely.
Estimates of risk of transmission of HTV are guesses about risk, not 
determinations of risk. They are based on what ifs: what if a surgeon 
cuts himself, and is infected with HTV, and the blood leaks out from his 
glove, and it is mingled with the patient’s blood, and there is sufficient 
amount of virus actually to infect the patient. These what ifs lead to es­
timates of the risk of transmission ranging from 1/40,000 to 1/400,000 
for surgeons, 1/260,000 to 1/2.6 million for dentists, to the chances of 
1 infection per 28,000 to 500,000 hours of surgery by an infected sur­
geon, to the chance of 1 infection in 21 million to 300 million hours of 
surgery if the HIV status of the physician is unknown (Centers for Dis­
ease Control 1991d; Lowenfels and Wormser 1991). Former Surgeon 
General C. Everett Koop stated that the risk is so remote that it will 
probably never be measured (Hilts 1991). The Office of Technology As­
sessment (OTA) of the U.S. Congress analyzed the CDC’s calculations 
of the risks of transmission and concluded that they are unreliable and 
likely to be overestimates (U.S. Congress 1991b). The OTA questioned 
each of the assumptions on which the calculations were based, noting 
that whether and how often they occur are unknown. We must remem­
ber that HIV infection has been apparently transmitted by only one 
dentist, and by no other health care professional in the ten years of the 
epidemic.
Whatever the exact probability o f risk is, it is extremely low. Of all 
the factors that patients die from as a direct result of medical care, AIDS 
is at the bottom of a very long list. Because these other risks are virtually 
all higher than the risk of contracting AIDS from a health care practitio­
ner and are socially acceptable risks, this risk does not qualify as signifi­
cant risk in law. Therefore, the risk o f HIV transmission from a 
practitioner also must be considered a socially acceptable risk.
Misconstruing Risk
The ability of policy makers and courts to assess rationally the low prob­
ability of the risk has been severely hampered by the real fear of death
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by AIDS. Two examples illustrate that some courts are simply not apply­
ing antidiscrimination law properly, either because of their own fear of 
AIDS, or because the experts did not distinguish between risk and 
harm.
The first case, Estate o f  William Behringer v. The Medical Center at 
Princeton,13 involved the rights of an otolaryngologist and plastic sur­
geon who was diagnosed with AIDS in June 1987. Because the diagnosis 
was made at the hospital where he was on staff, fellow staff learned of 
his condition almost immediately. Within a few weeks, his surgical priv­
ileges were suspended. He died two years later, having never performed 
surgery again. The widespread knowledge of his disease resulting from 
hospital gossip caused both patients and employees to desert him. His 
practice declined, resulting in emotional suffering and financial loss. 
Several staff committees and the executive committee of the medical 
and dental staff, composed of physicians, concluded that the risk of 
transmission was so remote that there was no reason Dr. Behringer 
should not retain his surgical privileges, and additionally that the risk 
was so low that it need not be disclosed as part of informed consent. 
The lone dissenter was Dennis Doody, president of the medical center, 
who offered no scientific or medical basis for disagreeing.
Mr. Doody, having recruited no allies from the scientific community, 
called upon the hospital’s legal counsel to support his feeling that a 
physician’s HIV-positive status should be divulged in consent forms be­
cause of “legal and social considerations.” At a meeting of the hospital’s 
board of trustees, Mr. Doody “expressed concern about the hospital’s 
reputation as well as potential litigation given public fear of AIDS.” 
The trustees voted to require the use of a special consent form that 
would tell patients that a doctor was HIV positive. As the court noted 
(and as all parties agreed), "this was a de facto prohibition of surgery.” 
Ultimately, based in part on the AMA’s “ no risk” policy statement 
(American Medical Association 1991), the trustees adopted a policy that 
health care practitioners “shall not perform procedures that pose any 
risk of HIV transmission to the patient.” * 14
The physician asserted that the trustees’ policy violated the New Jer­
sey Law Against Discrimination. The court recognized that New Jersey
1} Estate o f Behringer v. The Medical Center at Princeton, 249 N.J. Super. 597, 
592 A.2d 1251 (Super. Ct. N.J. 1991).
14 Id. (emphasis added).
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law requires an employer to prove a “ reasonable probability of substan­
tial harm” to others, and a “materially enhanced risk of serious injury to 
justify exclusion from the workplace.” Having stated these legal stan­
dards, the court ignored them, saying instead that “there is little dis­
agreement that a risk of transmission, however small, does exist. ” It also 
said, “ It is the court’s view that the risk of transmission is not the sole 
risk involved.” This is remarkable, because the only risk involved is the 
risk of transmission. The court, however, apparendy thought that the 
possibility of testing a patient for HIV, if a surgical accident occurred, 
should be considered a risk. However, the harm is dying of AIDS, not 
being voluntarily tested.
The court ultimately concluded that the medical center met its bur­
den of showing that the physician presented a “reasonable probability 
of substantial harm,” and therefore could bar him from performing sur­
gery. There is not one word in the opinion that supports a finding of a 
reasonable probability of transmission. Instead, the court based its deci­
sion on the possibility of substantial harm. In short, the substantiality of 
the harm, death from AIDS, blinded the court to its obligation to ob­
jectively assess the risk of the harm.
More troubling is the Leckelt case in which two federal courts upheld 
the firing of a nurse because he refused to disclose the results of his HTV 
test.15 As a licensed practical nurse (LPN) Mr. Leckelt administered 
medications orally and by injection, changed dressings, performed cath­
eterizations, administered enemas, and started intravenous tubes. He 
was occasionally assigned to the intensive care unit and to the emer­
gency and surgical recovery rooms. Nurse Leckelt regularly wore gloves, 
washed his hands, and followed infection control procedures.
In April 1986 a patient was diagnosed as having AIDS at the hospital 
where Nurse Leckelt worked. This patient had been Nurse Leckelt’s 
roommate for eight years, and Leckelt was “known to be a homosex­
ual.” 16 As a result, the hospital required him to take a test for HIV. 
Nurse Leckelt had already been tested, but had not received the results. 
The hospital would not schedule him for work until he provided the test 
results. Nurse Leckelt initially agreed, but later refused to provide the 
hospital with such test results and was fired for insubordination. Both
15 Leckelt v. Board o f Commissioners o f  Hospital District 1, 909 F.2d 820 (5th 
Cir. 1990).
16 Id. at 822.
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the U.S. district court and the court of appeals accepted the hospital’s 
pretext that Nurse Leckelt was not fired because he was suspected of 
having AIDS, but because he was “insubordinate” for not disclosing his 
HIV test results as ordered. The court of appeals did, however, address 
some of the antidiscrimination law issues. Correctly stating the four 
Arline criteria for determining the presence of a “significant risk,” the 
court misapplied them. It acknowledged that the risk of transmission 
from a health care worker to a patient is “extremely low and can be fur­
ther minimized through the use of universal precautions.” 17 However, 
the court observed that, because there is no cure for AIDS, the “poten­
tial harm” is extremely serious. The court felt that if the potential harm 
is death, the “extremely low” risk of death is irrelevant. If this is true, 
then eyeglass-wearing bus drivers are outside the protection of the law 
because if their glasses fall off they may go over a cliff and kill a busload 
of people. Even more remarkably, the court found that Nurse Leckelt 
generally complied with the hospital’s universal precautions policies, 
and that the duties he performed did not fall within the definition of 
“invasive procedures,” although “at least some of these duties provided 
potential opportunities for HIV transmission to patients.” 18
In upholding Nurse Leckelt’s firing, the court relied in part on CDC 
guidelines. For example, the court noted that if a health care worker has 
a parenteral or mucous-membrane exposure to blood or other bodily 
fluids, the CDC guidelines provided that the health care worker 
“should be evaluated chemically and serologically for evidence of HIV 
infection.” 19 Further, CDC guidelines stated that a health care worker 
infected with HIV “should be” counseled about the risk of infection to 
himself or herself. The court said that the hospital could not comply 
with these recommendations without knowing Nurse Leckelt’s HIV sta­
tus.20 This, of course, is not true. Given the possibility of Leckelt’s be­
ing HIV positive, in the absence of a test, the hospital could have 
treated him as if he were HIV positive. It could have counselled him. 
Because Nurse Leckelt did not perform invasive procedures, and used 
universal precautions when performing noninvasive procedures, he 
could not be deemed a significant risk to patients or other personnel,
17 Id. at 829.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 828.
20 Id. at 830.
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even if he were infected. Indeed, a draft of the CDC’s proposed new 
recommendations (Centers for Disease Control 1991a) designate the 
procedures that Nurse Leckelt performed as noninvasive.
Nurse Leckelt was thus fired for not being tested for HIV, even 
though he could not be fired for having HIV infection. A federal court 
permitted the firing of an LPN, who did not perform invasive proce­
dures, who used universal precautions, who could safely perform his du­
ties, and who in no way could be said to be a significant risk to anyone, 
because his roommate of eight years had died of AIDS and Nurse Leck­
elt was known to be a homosexual. We think this remarkable outcome 
can only be attributed to a combination of AIDS phobia and homopho­
bia, wrapped in the guise of a public health concern. The case illustrates 
how hospitals and courts misunderstand and misapply CDC recommen­
dations to justify unlawful and unfair actions. Thus, in the absence of 
explicit guidelines, the CDC cannot assume that courts will use their 
recommendations properly.
These cases represent a growing trend among courts and policy mak­
ers to conflate perceived risk with actual risk, and an inability to distin­
guish a risk of harm from harm itself. Another recent example is the 
recommendation by the Federation of State Medical Boards (FSMB) to 
state licensing boards that they require all physicians who perform expo­
sure-prone procedures to know their HTV and HBV status (Staver 1991)- 
This mandatory testing proposal flows directly from the July 1991 CDC 
guidelines, even though the CDC did not recommend mandatory test­
ing. If a doctor tests positive, the proposed policy says he should obtain 
the state licensing board’s permission before continuing to perform such 
procedures. Physicians who treat HTV-infected physicians should report 
them to state licensing boards. The FSMB would not, however, require 
physicians to disclose their HIV status to patients.
In support of these recommendations Dr. James Winn, the FSMB’s 
executive vice president, was quoted as saying, “The public perception 
is that something must be done about infected physicians even though 
scientifically there is only a remote chance of transmission. We wanted 
to restore public confidence without requiring the physician to disclose 
his HIV status to patients” (Staver 1991). We find disturbing Dr. 
Winn’s belief that public confidence would be restored by creating a 
system that says doctors who perform “exposure-prone” procedures are 
so dangerous that they must be tested, approved by a state board if they 
are infected, and turned in by their colleagues, but that patients should
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not be told of their physician’s HIV status. Even more remarkable is the 
statement by the FSMB president, psychiatrist Nancy Schneidman, re­
ferring to patients who are physicians. She said, “We’re approaching 
this like many reportable diseases, such as syphilis and gonorrhea. . . .  I 
also have to report patients who are sexual offenders. I don’t see how 
this is any different” (Staver 1991). There are several differences, among 
them the fact that doctors with syphilis and gonorrhea are not reported 
to their licensing boards. Even more startling is Dr. Schneidman’s anal­
ogy of doctors who are sex offenders and doctors who are infected with 
HIV. By definition, doctors who are sex offenders do not present a re­
mote risk of harm in the future; they have already intentionally caused 
harm. This is but one more example of decreasing ability to distinguish 
harm from risk of harm.
The removal of HIV-infected health care practitioners from their 
workplaces has a major negative impact on these individuals’ emotional 
well-being, finances, and role in society. It also prevents well-qualified, 
highly trained individuals from performing socially useful tasks (Rogers 
and Osborne 1991). Based on currently known facts, excluding them 
from practice is not good public health policy: it is unjustified discrimi­
nation. Thus, the risk of HIV transmission from a health care practitio­
ner belongs in the category of risks that are accepted by society.
Informed Consent
Because Americans have a long history of permitting individuals to 
make their own decisions in medical care, it has seemed natural to pro­
pose that individual patients rather than public health agencies should 
decide whether an HIV-infected physician should continue to practice. 
However, proposals to require HIV-infected health care professionals to 
notify or inform patients of their status simply transfer the responsibility 
for reasoned risk assessment and public health policy to individual pa­
tients. Moreover, the doctrine of informed consent does not give rise to 
a general right to know personal details about one’s physician, as the or­
igins of the doctrine make clear.
The early informed consent cases were a response to physicians’ pater­
nalistic practice of withholding information about the risk of invasive 
procedures in order to spare patients the emotional discomforts accom-
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panying such knowledge. The problem was not that patients were re­
ceiving insufficient information, but rather that they were hearing no 
information regarding risks. This prevented patients from determining 
for themselves whether the possible benefits to be derived from a rec­
ommended procedure were outweighed by the possible risks.
The disclosure of a physician’s HIV status presents a different set of 
issues. Unlike previous informed consent cases, the issue is not revealing 
risks of a procedure that are generally known to the medical commu­
nity, but the mandatory disclosure of extremely private information 
about one person to another person. Once the information is disclosed 
it will not remain private, as past experience has taught us. Patients are 
under no obligation to keep their physician’s private medical informa­
tion confidential, and undoubtedly the community at large will learn of 
the physician’s condition. Of course, this is the goal of disclosure. But it 
also means that the physician will lose his or her livelihood because of 
the fear engendered by AIDS. Even if hospitals and clinics are willing to 
continue to employ HIV-infected physicians, mandatory disclosure gives 
patients the de facto authority to exclude them from the workplace. 
Employers should not have the authority to exclude HIV-infected practi­
tioners from working, absent the practitioner’s presenting a “significant 
risk” or “direct threat” of serious harm, nor should employers be able to 
delegate this authority to patients.
Unlike early arguments disparaging informed consent, this argument 
is not at all paternalistic. The withholding of the HTV status of the pa­
tient’s practitioner is not based on the premise that the patient may 
make a bad decision affecting him- or herself, but, rather, would make 
a decision adversely affecting another person. Therefore, information re­
garding an extraordinarily remote risk of harm may be withheld from a 
patient because of the certainty of harm that disclosure will cause the 
practitioner. This conclusion is not a departure from established law on 
informed consent. Nor does it diverge from ethical principles on in­
formed consent. Furthermore, the extraordinarily remote risk of trans­
mission itself would justify not disclosing it under the general informed 
consent rulings.
The fact that patients may want to know this personal information 
about their physician, dentist, or nurse, and may even act upon it, is 
not enough to conclude that there is an obligation to disclose such in­
formation. In a world in which infinitesimal risk is considered worthy of 
an affirmative obligation of disclosure, little private information is safe.
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Given the choice, patients might well wish to know if their male sur­
geon is a promiscuous homosexual or if their female surgeon engages in 
promiscuous heterosexual behavior. Regardless of what HIV tests show, 
patients might wish to avoid the increased risks, however small, these 
surgeons present over the confirmed monogamous surgeon. But we 
think few, if any, would argue that there is a duty to disclose one’s sex­
ual behavior just because patients are concerned. This interest might 
even be “rational” from patients’ perspectives because they are seeking 
to reduce their risks, again, however small, of contracting HIV (see the 
article by Daniels in this issue). However, the avoidance of such remote 
risks by patients is not a sufficiently compelling reason to require the 
loss of privacy (and, ultimately, loss of livelihood) suffered by individu­
als forced to disclose intimate information about themselves.
In the New York school exclusion case, parents asked the court to or­
der the school board to disclose the identity of the HIV-infected child if 
the court would not exclude the child from school. The concerned par­
ents obviously wanted this information so that their child would not 
have to come in contact with the infected child. The parents’ desire to 
protect their children was not “ irrational.” By avoiding and isolating the 
infected child the parents could avoid even the remotest of risks to their 
children. The court, however, would not allow this breach of privacy 
with its resulting stigmatization in order to soothe the parents’ fear.
Until recently, courts have not required that personal information 
about physicians be disclosed to patients. In one case, the California Su­
preme Court said a physician-researcher should have disclosed his finan­
cial interest in a cell line he planned to develop from his patient’s 
spleen. In the court’s words:
A physician who treats a patient in whom he also has a research inter­
est has potentially conflicting loyalties. . . . The possibility that an 
interest extraneous to the patient’s health has affected the physician’s 
judgment is something a reasonable patient would want to know in 
deciding whether to consent to a proposed course of treatment. It is 
material to the patient’s decision and, thus, a prerequisite to in­
formed consent.21
There seems to be no way to distinguish among disclosures about poten­
tial profit from a cell line, financial difficulties, kids in college, a mort-
21 Moore v. Regents, University o f California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
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gage on a new boat, ot a drop in the stock market that affects a doctor’s 
net worth. Accordingly, the question to be addressed is, When is the 
conflict of interest serious enough to affect the physician’s independent 
judgment of the patient’s best interests? When it is, the physician 
should not be permitted to burden the patient with her conflict, but 
should have to disqualify herself from the case.
In a second case, a Louisiana court of appeals faulted a physician for 
failure to disclose his “alcohol abuse” to a patient.22 His patient lost 
control of his bladder and bowel following a laminectomy, although 
nothing in the case indicated that this resulted from the physician’s al­
cohol abuse. The court noted that two years after this operation was per­
formed, the physician’s license was suspended on the grounds of “habit­
ual or recurring drunkenness” and “medical incompetency.” If it is true 
that this physician was a “habitual drunk” and “medically incompe­
tent,” then informing his patients of these facts should not be a defense 
to the injury these conditions caused, and the Louisiana court is wrong 
in concluding that such disclosure would be a defense. If a surgeon is 
not qualified, he should not practice. If the hospital in which he prac­
tices knows he is dangerous to patients, it has the responsibility to pro­
hibit his practicing, and licensing boards should suspend or revoke the 
license of an unqualified practitioner. It should not be left to patients to 
make these decisions. We would be surprised if the AMA or CDC 
would instruct the “habitually drunk” surgeon either to discontinue 
practice or inform his patients that he suffers from alcoholism.
The law of negligence embodies the social policy decision that un­
qualified practitioners present socially impermissible risks. If unquali­
fied, handicapped, alcoholic, or HTV-infected health care professionals 
present an impermissible risk to patients, they must be prevented from 
practicing to protect the public. Informed consent regarding their lack 
of skill or danger to patients is irrelevant. Similarly, we disqualify pilots 
with heart conditions from flying commercial passenger aircraft; we do 
not permit passengers to “consent” to the added danger of being pi­
loted by someone who is at significant risk of suffering a heart attack 
during flight.
The doctrine of informed consent should not be distorted to enable 
hospitals or public health agencies to shift their burden of ensuring that 
practitioners are qualified to treat patients. Likewise, the doctrine of in-
22 Hidding v. Williams, 578 So.2d 1192 (La. Ct. App., 5th Cir. 1991).
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formed consent should not be used to destroy the privacy of an individ­
ual who is not just a health care practitioner, but also a person with 
rights.
This does not mean that patients may not ask practitioners about 
their HIV status, sexual preferences, and behavior or history of drug use 
or blood transfusion. However, practitioners need not answer. The free­
dom to ask does not imply any affirmative duty on the part of practitio­
ners to disclose private information. Similarly, patients can ask physicians 
about their religious beliefs, racial ancestry, or national origins. Some 
patients might find the answers material and make decisions based on 
the answers. Again, the fact that patients would like to know this infor­
mation does not mean that practitioners must disclose it. The practitio­
ners’ right is to keep private information private, if they so choose. If a 
patient is uncomfortable with a practitioner’s refusal to answer, he or 
she is entitled to seek another practitioner, not to receive a nonvoluntary 
answer.
Current data regarding the risk of HIV transmission do not justify ex­
cluding infected practitioners from the workplace. Neither do they jus­
tify requiring practitioners to disclose their HIV status. Thus, the remote 
risk of HIV transmission cannot qualify as an optional risk that patients 
may choose to avoid. A patient’s curiosity, however “rational,” does not 
convert private information into a material risk that must be disclosed. 
The doctrine of informed consent should not be turned into a tool for 
discrimination. Moreover, proposals to require practitioners to disclose 
their HIV status so that patients can choose whether to be treated by 
them would undermine the rights of patients themselves by imposing 
on them the burden of determining whether a practitioner was qualified 
to practice. Patients who consented to be treated by an unqualified 
practitioner could be considered to have waived their rights to accept­
able health care, and left without recourse if an injury resulted.
Conclusion
The transmission of HIV from David Acer to Kimberly Bergalis focused 
public concern on who transmitted HIV, not on how HIV was trans­
mitted. What was feared was the person — a dentist, and by extension 
all physicians and other health care practitioners—not what a dentist 
did or did not do. Personalizing HIV infection diverted attention from
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the particular techniques and behaviors that can spread infection to par­
ticular groups of people.
Defining persons as the problem makes removing the persons the ob­
vious solution. This reaction perpetuates the destructive stereotype that 
there are categories of people who are dangerous, previously limited to 
gay men and intravenous drug users, rather than behaviors that are dan­
gerous, such as unprotected sex with multiple partners, needle sharing, 
and poor infection control techniques.
The policies of the CDC, the AMA, and others unintentionally legiti­
mized this way of thinking. Although both groups have rightly called 
for the use of infection control techniques, they have also justified the 
removal of health care practitioners who represent only a theoretical risk 
to their patients. This has sent the message that health care practitioners 
constitute a deadly threat, and has drowned out the message of infec­
tion control.
Based on existing data, the exclusion of HIV-infected health care 
practitioners is unjustified as a matter of public policy and public 
health. Such a policy will not reduce the spread of HTV. It constitutes 
an empty gesture that responds to public fear in a symbolic but ineffec­
tive way. Consequently, it constitutes a distraction from the important 
and difficult tasks that are required to reduce the spread of HIV.
Exclusionary policies will have no positive effect on the AIDS epi­
demic, but they will have a serious negative impact on individual health 
care practitioners and on society as a whole. The proposed exclusionary 
policies demonstrate an inability to assess appropriately the nature of 
risks, and a willingness to stigmatize and harm sick people on the basis 
of fear alone. How we treat HIV-infected practitioners also will affect 
how we treat other disabled people who constitute a theoretical risk of 
harm. Exclusionary policies mean health care practitioners risk losing 
their livelihood if they learn of their infection or seek treatment. All 
people whose behavior puts them at risk for HTV infection should be 
encouraged to obtain diagnosis and treatment, and disincentives to such 
desirable behavior must be avoided as a matter of both public and per­
sonal health. As a result o f the Behringer, Leckelt, and similar cases, as 
well as the policies that we have described in this article, the only ratio­
nal response of a health care practitioner who wishes to avoid stigmati­
zation and loss of livelihood is to avoid diagnosis and treatment, or to 
keep such matters secret.
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Labeling HIV-infected health care professionals as too risky to prac­
tice their profession also sends them the wrong message. Health care 
practitioners are at significantly greater (although still low) risk of con­
tracting HIV from patients than patients are of contracting HIV from 
them. Through a long and ongoing process, the health care professions 
have largely accepted the very low risk of contracting HIV infections and 
the obligation to treat HIV-infected patients (Gerbert et al. 1991). If we 
tell HIV-positive health care practitioners that they are too dangerous to 
treat patients, why should they not believe that HIV-positive patients 
are too dangerous to be treated? Policy makers cannot expect health care 
practitioners to continue to treat infected patients while at the same 
time arguing to exclude HIV-positive practitioners who pose a much 
lower risk of HIV transmission to patients than patients pose to them.
Instead of focusing on people with HIV infection, public health pol­
icy must turn its attention to the particular practices and procedures that 
facilitate HIV transmission. The CDC and AM A rightly recommend ad­
herence to universal precautions. New technologies and techniques must 
be developed to prevent blood transfer. Enforcing policies for infection 
control is a more plausible and effective means of reducing the risk of 
HIV transmission than removing health care professionals from prac­
tices. It also has the advantage of preventing the transmission of other 
diseases.
The rules issued by the Occupational Safety and Health Administra­
tion (1991) on reducing exposure to bloodborne pathogens were entirely 
directed toward improving equipment and practices. This was not front­
page news. However, if we are to reduce further the small risk of trans­
mission of bloodborne diseases, we must adopt and enforce OSHA’s 
effective preventive measures, and not engage in the symbolic gesture 
that exclusionary policies represent. Good infection control policies have 
two great advantages over exclusionary policies: they can be effective if 
enforced, and they do not infringe on anyone’s human rights.
Our position does not promise zero risk. It is possible that in the fu­
ture a second health care practitioner will transmit HIV to a patient. If 
this occurs public health experts should do what they do best: find out 
how it happened and how it could have been prevented, and then edu­
cate the public, putting the event in proper perspective. If poor practice 
caused the problem, those responsible should be retrained or punished. 
The occurrence of harm does not change the analysis. The response
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should not automatically be to test all health care practitioners and stop 
their practices, any more than we stop anesthetizing patients in surgery 
when a patient dies from anesthesia.
The effort to improve the practice of health care practitioners should 
not be limited solely to those who present a risk of the particular harm 
of HIV infection; it should be part of a larger effort to ensure patient 
safety. The focus on HIV-infected health care professionals is suspect 
and discriminatory because it is not part of such an effort. Instead, it 
largely ignores the higher risks presented by myriad practices in the de­
livery of medical care.
The fact that HIV transmission from a health care practitioner to a 
patient is possible may make it “a risk” of health care, but does not 
make it a significant risk to public health or one that can be classified as 
socially impermissible. In the absence of any public health policy justifi­
cation for discriminating against health care professionals, HTV trans­
mission in the health care setting remains one of many acceptable risks 
that we must live with, and probably among the least dangerous ones. 
The burden of proof is on those who would exclude health care profes­
sionals with HTV infection from practicing their profession. That burden 
has not been met.
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